The trut and nothin but the trut in our search for weapons of mass donkeys, and clean, extremely cheap, unlimited new energy systems missing since the late 1940's - wonder if that has anything to do with the Trouble With Physics and the threats 
twenty first century civilization faces from lack and limitation fostering Resource Wars with obscenely profitable dinosaur energy systems causing global warmingReport Cites Major CIA Lapses Before 9/11
Insert: beautiful, beautiful words "Systematic Breakdown" - imagine a tsunami approaching a seashore village, and 50-60 people knew about it, but through systematic breakdown, failed to get the warning across and all died.
WASHINGTON, Aug. 21, 2007
(CBS/AP) The CIA's top leaders failed to use their available
powers, never developed a comprehensive plan to stop al Qaeda and missed crucial opportunities to thwart two hijackers in the run-up to Sept. 11, the agency's own watchdog concluded in a bruising report released Tuesday. Completed in June 2005 and kept classified until now, the 19-page executive summary finds extensive fault with the actions of senior CIA leaders and others beneath them. "The agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner," the CIA inspector general found. "They did not always work effectively and cooperatively," the report stated. Nearly three years before 9/11, then-CIA Director George Tenet signed a directive declaring "we are at war" with Osama Bin Laden and directed that "no resources or people (be) spared," reports CBS News national security correspondent David Martin. But the inspector general found "no…strategic plan was ever created" and no extra money or people were added to operations against Bin Laden. Yet the review team led by Inspector General John Helgerson found neither a "single point of failure nor a silver bullet" that would have stopped the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people. In a statement, CIA Director Michael Hayden said the decision to release the report was not his choice or preference, but that he was making the report available as required by Congress in a law President George W. Bush signed earlier this month. "I thought the release of this report would distract officers serving their country on the front lines of a global conflict," Hayden said. "It will, at a minimum, consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed." The report does cover terrain heavily examined by a congressional inquiry and the Sept. 11 Commission. However, the CIA watchdog's report goes further than previous reviews to examine the personal failings of individuals within the agency who led the pre-Sept. 11 efforts against al Qaeda. Helgerson's team found that no CIA employees violated the law or were part of any misconduct. The report recommends Tenet and other senior officers face possible disciplinary action, adds Martin, but a statement by the current CIA director says that's not going to happen. In October 2005, then-CIA Director Porter Goss also rejected the recommendation. He said he had spoken personally with the current employees named in the report, and he trusted their abilities and dedication. "The report unveiled no mysteries," Goss said. Hayden stuck by Goss's decision. Providing a glimpse of a series of shortfalls laid out in the longer, still-classified report, the executive summary says:
· U.S. spy agencies, which were overseen by Tenet, lacked a comprehensive strategic plan to counter Osama bin Laden prior to Sept. 11. The inspector general concluded that Tenet "by virtue of his position, bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was ever created."
· The CIA's analysis of al Qaeda before Sept. 2001 was lacking. No comprehensive report focusing on bin Laden was written after 1993, and no comprehensive report laying out the threats of 2001 was assembled. "A number of important issues were covered insufficiently or not at all," the report found.
· The CIA and the National Security Agency tussled over their responsibilities in dealing with al Qaeda well into 2001. Only Tenet's personal involvement could have led to a timely resolution, the report concluded.
· The CIA station charged with monitoring bin Laden, code-named Alec Station, was overworked, lacked operational experience, expertise and training. The report recommended forming accountability boards for the CIA Counterterror Center chiefs from 1998 to 2001, including Black.
· Although 50 to 60 people read at least one CIA cable about two of the hijackers, the information was not shared with the proper offices and agencies. "That so many individuals failed to act in this case reflects a systemic breakdown....
(CBS/AP) The CIA's top leaders failed to use their available
powers, never developed a comprehensive plan to stop al Qaeda and missed crucial opportunities to thwart two hijackers in the run-up to Sept. 11, the agency's own watchdog concluded in a bruising report released Tuesday. Completed in June 2005 and kept classified until now, the 19-page executive summary finds extensive fault with the actions of senior CIA leaders and others beneath them. "The agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner," the CIA inspector general found. "They did not always work effectively and cooperatively," the report stated. Nearly three years before 9/11, then-CIA Director George Tenet signed a directive declaring "we are at war" with Osama Bin Laden and directed that "no resources or people (be) spared," reports CBS News national security correspondent David Martin. But the inspector general found "no…strategic plan was ever created" and no extra money or people were added to operations against Bin Laden. Yet the review team led by Inspector General John Helgerson found neither a "single point of failure nor a silver bullet" that would have stopped the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people. In a statement, CIA Director Michael Hayden said the decision to release the report was not his choice or preference, but that he was making the report available as required by Congress in a law President George W. Bush signed earlier this month. "I thought the release of this report would distract officers serving their country on the front lines of a global conflict," Hayden said. "It will, at a minimum, consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed." The report does cover terrain heavily examined by a congressional inquiry and the Sept. 11 Commission. However, the CIA watchdog's report goes further than previous reviews to examine the personal failings of individuals within the agency who led the pre-Sept. 11 efforts against al Qaeda. Helgerson's team found that no CIA employees violated the law or were part of any misconduct. The report recommends Tenet and other senior officers face possible disciplinary action, adds Martin, but a statement by the current CIA director says that's not going to happen. In October 2005, then-CIA Director Porter Goss also rejected the recommendation. He said he had spoken personally with the current employees named in the report, and he trusted their abilities and dedication. "The report unveiled no mysteries," Goss said. Hayden stuck by Goss's decision. Providing a glimpse of a series of shortfalls laid out in the longer, still-classified report, the executive summary says:· U.S. spy agencies, which were overseen by Tenet, lacked a comprehensive strategic plan to counter Osama bin Laden prior to Sept. 11. The inspector general concluded that Tenet "by virtue of his position, bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was ever created."
· The CIA's analysis of al Qaeda before Sept. 2001 was lacking. No comprehensive report focusing on bin Laden was written after 1993, and no comprehensive report laying out the threats of 2001 was assembled. "A number of important issues were covered insufficiently or not at all," the report found.
· The CIA and the National Security Agency tussled over their responsibilities in dealing with al Qaeda well into 2001. Only Tenet's personal involvement could have led to a timely resolution, the report concluded.
· The CIA station charged with monitoring bin Laden, code-named Alec Station, was overworked, lacked operational experience, expertise and training. The report recommended forming accountability boards for the CIA Counterterror Center chiefs from 1998 to 2001, including Black.
· Although 50 to 60 people read at least one CIA cable about two of the hijackers, the information was not shared with the proper offices and agencies. "That so many individuals failed to act in this case reflects a systemic breakdown....
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